The topic of issue voting is one of the most important and widely researched subjects in the study of American political science. The extent to which issues affect electoral choices has been a controversial question for decades, and with the advent of an extended time series of adequate survey data, a heated debate has also arisen concerning whether the electorate is now more issue oriented than in the past (see Asher, 1980, chap. 4; Converse, 1975; Kessel, 1972 for insightful reviews of this literature).
One of many problems in the issue voting controversy is defining what we mean by issues in the first place. Virtually any topic that is discussed in a political campaign involves a debatable point between the candidates and can therefore be considered an issue. As Stokes (1966) has pointed out, even matters on which the candidates agree about basic goals such as peace and prosperity can be considered issues. These he termed "valence issues," in that they link the candidates with some condition that is either positively or negatively valued by the electorate. What is critical in this case is not the means by which a problem is solved Received: November 4, 1983 Revision received: August 1, 1984 Accepted for publication : October 3, 1984 (Le., policy preferences), but rather whether or not the problem is solved (Le., performance in office). Such a distinction is critical for drawing appropriate substantive interpretations from election outcomes as well as for evaluating the functioning of democratic systems. In the former, a policy mandate is conveyed by the voters; in the latter, voters merely reward or punish based on performance considerations.
Another crucial dimension underlying theoretical considerations of issue voting is the electorate's time perspective, as Fiorina (1981) and Abramson, Aldrich, and Rhode (1982) have recently reminded us. The concern here is whether voters make decisions retrospectively, looking to the past, or prospectively, holding expectations for the future. If voters focus solely on the past, then they can only ratify or reject, whereas if prospective voting occurs, then they can also guide in the form of a mandate.
These conceptual distinctions between retrospective versus prospective and policy versus performance voting are thus of great significance. At the individual level these dimensions hold implications for voter rationality and information availability (see Fiorina, 1981) . For example, the information-seeking costs necessary to evaluate the past performance of an administration are far less than those needed to assess a set of future government policies. At the collective level, inter-pretations of election outcomes often depend on whether people vote retrospectively or prospectively on the basis of policy or performance. These concerns loom particularly large after an incumbent is defeated and the victor inevitably claims a mandate to redirect government policy. But does the electorate really consider a challenger's program and promises for the future, or do voters merely throw the incumbent administration out if it is unable to produce satisfactory outcomes to the nation's problems? The major substantive works on the subject leave us with contradictory answers and a good measure of conceptual confusion.
V.O. Key's work on the subject has been profoundly influential and is usually interpreted as placing "primary emphasis on policy outcomes rather than the means that lead to those outcomes" (Fiorina, 1981, p. 194 ). Yet Key's writing at times suggests that the focus of issue voting could be either policy or performance. For example, he writes:
If public opinion expresses itself with relative clarity in retrospective disapproval of performance or policy, it may also express itself in the same manner in confirmation or ratification of past policy or performance. Only infrequently is a new program or a new course of action advocated with such force and the attention it receives so widespread that the polling may be regarded as advance approval of a proposed course of action (1961, p. 474 ). Downs (1957) , on the other hand, gives greater weight to policy alternatives as the basis of the vote decision. Fiorina (1981, p. 13 ) summarizes the differences between Downs and Key by saying:
Under the Downsian view, elections have policy implications. . . . The Downsian citizen compares the challenger's and the incumbent's platforms, interpreting the matter in light of the incumbent's past performance. But under the traditional theory (V.O. Key), elections have no policy implications other than a generalized acceptance or rejection of the status quo.
Fiorina's use of the term "performance," however, appears to correspond more closely with Key's meaning-how effectively a problem is being handled-than with the Downsian notion of performance. Indeed, although Downs's use of the term "performance" is less than totally unambiguous, it seems clear that performance evaluations deal with a comparison of the policies associated with different parties or candidates. In fact Downs (1957, p. 43) defines the term ~'perfor mance rating" as involving a comparison of "the utility incomes (voters) are actually receiving with those they would be receiving if the ideal government were in power." Performance ratings, he suggests, are employed by voters when both parties currently have identical policies and platforms or the policies of different parties produce identical utility incomes.
Thus when Key and Downs use the term "performance," they obviously have different concepts in mind. Voting for a party because it has worked hard toward peace is not the same as supporting that party because its policies or programs are considered to be the best means of producing peace. Regardless of whether the comparison hinges on current platforms or the preferred positions of an ideal government, any vote decision based on consideration of alternative programs is policy rather than performance voting. Performance rating in the Downsian sense, therefore, seems to be a misnomer. For the purpose of conceptual clarity, Key's definition of performance assessments appears preferable in our judgment.
Turning to the time dimension, Key was a clear proponent of retrospective voting. According to Key the vote decision usually does not reflect a considered endorsement of a proposed set of policies nor does it typically suggest anticipated future performance. In contrast, using the past as a guide to future expectations is a feature of both Downs's and Fiorina's thinking on the subject. If incumbents are judged by the electorate to have done poorly in the past, then they will not be expected to perform well in the future. Of course the incumbent may still be preferred when compared with the expected future performance of the challenger. In short, the past performance of both competing parties is compared and projected onto what the parties can be expected to do in the future. In fact Fiorina (1981, p. 197) states that "In analysis after analysis, future expectations dwarfed the effects of retrospective judgments."
In summary, from V.O. Key's model of retrospective voting emerges an image of voters as an avenging lot who reward or punish the incumbent administration for its past performance. Downs, on the other hand, tends to emphasize policy instruments combined with a concern about which party will provide the maximum satisfaction in the future. Projections into the future, but regarding outcomes rather than the means to attaining those results, form the core of the vote decision for Fiorina.
Assessing the Validity of Available Measures
Despite the significant theoretical implications associated with the two dimensions differentiating retrospective from prospective and policy from performance voting, little attention has been devoted to ascertaining whether or not these distinctions are empirically verifiable. Although Fiorina and Abramson et al. are sensitive to the importance of adequately measuring this twodimensional structure, they devote virtually no time to demonstrating the validity of the indicators used to operationalize these concepts. Face validity is surprisingly the only criterion used by these investigators to classify survey questions as measuring retrospective rather than prospective, or policy rather than performance assessments; the personal judgment of these social scientists and the language of the survey questions are the only evidence to support these important theoretical distinctions.
The weakness of this evidence is readily apparent from the lack of agreement in their respective classifications. For example, Fiorina (p. 138) concludes that the question about which party would best handle the most important problem facing the country is clearly prospective. Abramson et al. (p. 146) , however, argue that this question could be either retrospective or prospective, and they caution that "some of the most important problems cited are less clearly retrospective than others. Comparability and interpretability problems thereby are raised." Similarly, these authors differ in their interpretations of the sevenpoint issues scales used in the election studies to measure proximity voting. Abramson et al. (chaps. 6 and 7) are quite emphatic in their use of these scales to measure prospective policy. Fiorina (p. 143) , on the other hand, condemns the items noting that "the time perspective is hopelessly muddied. Thus use of the seven-point scales ... confounds the attempt to analyze the comparative importance of retrospective judgments and future expectations. "
Fiorina at least recognizes this validity problem. Throughout his book he tells us that available survey items seldom contain a clear time perspective or enable one to separate policy instruments from policy outcomes. Yet this apparent measurement confusion does not deter him from concluding that future expectations greatly outweigh the effects of retrospective evaluations. Likewise, acknowledged measurement problems do not prevent Abramson et al. from concluding that the 1980 election was evenly balanced between retrospective and prospective voting (p. 197) . But how can we be at all certain that these conclusions are correct, given these measurement difficulties?
An initial step that can be taken in assessing the magnitude of these difficulties involves a more rigorous examination of the measurement properties and interrelationships among the available survey items. We therefore conducted a factor analysis of several items from the 1980 National Election Study that were thought to capture the two dimensions of Fiorina's retrospective voting model. From this we can learn much about the individual items and, furthermore, ascertain whether the public in fact comprehends the world of politics according to the hypothesized latent dimensions.
In general the results of the factor analysis provide support for the hypothesized distinctions between policy and performance and prospective versus retrospective evaluations, as a fourdimensional solution was uncovered. The factor loadings for the varimax rotated solution shown in Table 1 suggest factors representing retrospective performance, prospective performance, personal retrospective evaluations, and prospective policy considerations.
The first dimension consists heavily of retrospective assessments of how well President Carter was handling his job and several specific governmental problems such as inflation, unemployment, and the hostage crisis in Iran. In contrast, the second factor is defined primarily by prospective items which ask how well Reagan would do on the economy, providing strong leadership and developing good relations with other countries if he were president. A comparable set of items asking how Carter would do fell onto the first factor, however.' Despite the future orientation of these questions, people apparently responded to them in a retrospective fashion, thereby demonstrating the weakness of their face validity. There is some overlap, though, between the two factors on Reagan's expected performance, indicating that people make some comparison of the incumbent's past record to the future potential of the challenger. A similar overlap is also evident on the questions concerning Carter's handling of the Iran and Afghanistan crises. Nevertheless, the evidence is clear enough to conclude that the public does distinguish between retrospective and prospective performance assessments of the candidates.
Evaluations of one's personal financial situation form yet a third distinct factor. These items which tap direct experience with economic conditions are labeled simple retrospective evaluations by Fiorina (p. 80) . In contrast, assessments of how a given political actor or agency is dealing with a 'The only difference between the Reagan and Carter items is that the former ask about how well the phrases describe' 'Reagan if he were president," whereas the latter ask about "Carter as president." Yet, work on survey research methodology shows that what is important is the direct question, which is clearly written in prospective terms, and not the introduction.
This illustrates how the election study often confuses the time dimension in its questions, although in this case respondents apparently sorted it out and focused on past performance. problem he terms mediated retrospective evaluations. We prefer to call these latter judgments politicized evaluations in order to differentiate them from personal retrospective evaluations for which that connection is not salient, such as those in the third factor. These results appear to confirm Kinder and Kiewiet's (1979) contention of a separation between self-interest and collective judgments. However, our interpretation of this phenomenon differs somewhat from theirs. The factor loadings of the personal economic concerns coincides with the argument that people generally do not connect their own situation with politics because they are self-rather than system-blaming (Brody & Sniderman, 1977; Kinder & Kiewiet, 1979) . The difference in interpretation comes with regard to the items presumed to measure collective orientation. The types of measures used by Kinder and Kiewiet to represent collective judgments (including the question on the state of the national economy) all load on the retrospective performance factor in choice because they reflect politicized retrospective judgments, not because they are collective in content.
The final factor appears to reflect a concern with prospective policies. Contrary to Fiorina's contention, the seven-point scales are free of any contamination with evaluations of past candidate performance. Of course the results may have been different if the analysis had been based on proximity measures incorporating both the respondent's position and his or her placement of the candidates on the scale. However, the candidate placements alone are more theoretically appropriate to our concerns as the critical focus of prospective policy evaluations centers on the types of actions voters believe the candidates will take if elected. The factor loadings for these items suggest a set of citizen concerns focused on policy instruments in the future.
Much less clearly conveyed by the factor structure, however, is the reference for the set of items that ask which party would better handle various problems. Although Fiorina argues that these questions are future oriented, the factor analysis demonstrates that they are thoroughly confounded with both retrospective and prospective performance, as well as overlapping with concerns about future policy actions. Yet the results do provide some evidence for Fiorina's notion that judgments of political parties are reflections of the past projected onto the future. At the same time, the results also confirm the suggestion that beliefs about which party will best handle a particular problem are shaped partly by evaluations of the past and expected future performance of the current candidates for office (Kinder & Kiewiet, 1979, p. 519) .
In summary, Table 1 provides evidence for the contention that the public both differentiates a time perspective and distinguishes between policy and performance when evaluating candidates for president. The results also show a common limitation in recent work on retrospective voting, namely that these studies are based on measures that are not well designed to distinguish either retrospective from prospective considerations or policy from performance concerns. Indeed, as Fiorina acknowledges, this problem plagues his whole project. Moreover, even the limited number of questions that can be shown to differentiate these dimensions properly occur primarily in only the very recent election studies, thereby preventing direct comparisons over an extended time span.
An Alternative Approach
In an attempt to overcome some of these limitations we use an alternative approach to the subject based on open-ended questions that ask respondents what they like and dislike about each of the presidential candidates. Because these questions have been asked in an identical fashion in all of the SRC/CPS studies since 1952, direct comparisons can be made across time. Furthermore, these questions are particularly useful for our purposes because they impose no constraints on how respondents conceptualize political issues.
There are, however, some limitations to the open-ended questions that we readily acknowledge. On each individual question many respondents fail to give any substantive response, and roughly 101110 in any given year have nothing at all to say to any of the candidate questions. Thus our ability to investigate how people process information relevant to judgments of the candidates is constrained by the lack of articulateness among some respondents. Also, interviewers occasionally fail to probe sufficiently so as to code the answers properly according to our theon;tical interests. For example, if someone simply says he likes Nixon because of Vietnam, we do not know whether this is a policy or performance statement unless the interviewer elicits a further response.
Despite these limitations, the open-ended questions provide the richest set of available evidence for investigating issue evaluations over time. Indeed, the fact that the same limitations hold true in each year provides a control for these shortcomings. Changes that may be evident in the preponderance of retrospective rather than prospective or policy versus performance responses at different time points should thus reflect real differences and not methodological artifacts created by new or revised survey questions.
The only major drawback we faced in utilizing the like/dislike questions was that the data were not suitably coded for our theoretical interests. As coded in the ICPSR released datasets, the responses do not contain a time perspective, nor do they consistently separate policy from performance. Therefore we returned to the original handwritten transcripts of the interviews in order to recode the data-a very substantial task given that over 13,000 respondents have been asked these questions since 1952.
The coding scheme was designed to differentiate retrospective from prospective comments and policy from performance for each of the like/dislike questions. Rather than attempting to code each individual remark, we chose simply to code the complete answer to each question. Because some of the answers contained a mix of comments, we used a multiple category code with varying gradations of certainty. The time dimension code, for example, ranged from clearly retrospective through mixed to clearly prospective. Similarly, the second dimension was coded with a five-point scale running from clearly performance to clearly policy oriented.
On the second dimension we also included a set of code categories that refer to candidate attributes without any obvious policy or performance conterit. Many candidates attributes, such as past political experience, decisiveness in making decisions, and the ability to follow through on promises clearly convey performance-relevant information. However, other personal attributes such as age, speaking style, and charisma hold less obvious implications. To avoid clouding the distinction between policy and performance, responses about candidate attributes were assigned a separate code unless they contained an unambiguous policy or performance reference.
The task of differentiating a time perspective or separating policy from performance judgments may seem rather difficult in the abstract; in reality, though, most of the comments were relatively easy to code. He is the one man who can curb government deficits.
The country will be at war with him as president.
Dislike Goldwater: He won't follow up on his promises.
Like Johnson:
Prospective Policy
Like Reagan:
He's good with other countries. At least we won't have war with him.
His plan for cutting taxes and reducing the size of government is a sure fire cure for inflation. Initially these data can be utilized to determine the extent to whiCh the policy/performance and retrospective/prospective dimensions are used to evaluate presidential candidates. By aggregating data from the eight presidential election studies between 1952 and 1980 we find that candidate performance assessments have outnumbered policy considerations by nearly two to one. Whereas 41.60/0 of the open-ended responses focused on performance, only 23.7% were about policy instruments. Another 4.5% of the comments were mixed between policy and performance, and the remaining 30.2% centered purely on candidate attributes. These latter comments were the most likely to be positive (58.7%), adding yet another piece of confirmatory evidence for Sears's (1969 Sears's ( , 1983 ) positivity bias theory. Of the performance responses, 54.2% were positive compared to only 48.5% for the policy comments. Thus, all other things being equal, candidates for office have the most incentive to draw public attention to their personal characteristics and the least incentive to highlight policy matters-a strategy that many have followed in the past.
These categories vary greatly in terms of the time referent that people use with them. Overall, 67.
0% of the open-ended responses were coded as retrospective, 29.4% as prospective, and 3.6% as mixed. Virtually all of the candidate-attribute responses were coded as retrospective, with the only major exceptions being comments about Eisenhower's health or Reagan's age, which imply that they might not be able to complete their terms. Retrospective judgments dominated the performance category by slightly over three to one, whereas the policy category was almost evenly divided between retrospective and prospective comments. One might expect retrospective responses to be more positive than prospective responses, as they are more likely to consist of attribute and performance references. However, this bias notwithstanding we find that only 50.4070 of the retrospective comments were positive compared to 59.2% of the prospective comments. This finding is reflective of V.O. Key's notion that retrospective judgments often involve "throwing the rascals out." Looking to the future generally evokes more optimism.
Of course aggregating the data from all eight election studies hides many theoretically interesting differences concerning how individual candidates have been evaluated. On a general level, for example, one would expect that incumbents should be judged quite differently from challengers. Because they have a past record of achievement in office, incumbents are more likely to be evaluated on the basis of retrospective performance. Challengers have to be evaluated more prospectively, however, and with a less visible past performance record policy matters are more likely to be salient. More specifically, examining judgments of the individual candidates will shed light on a number of controversies concerning the role of issues in recent elections. Second, there is somewhat less incentive for candidates in nonincumbent races to emphasize policies compared to challengers of incumbents, as the latter need such proposals to put themselves on a more equal footing with incumbents whereas the former do not. Finally, it could simply be that when forced to make a choice between two candidates without presidential experience, voters find it much easier to judge who would do a better job than which policy course to pursue. Comparing two new and untested policy programs may require too much information processing for the average voter. The American Political Science Review Vol. 79
Given the unknown quality of nonincumbents and the fascination of the media with all aspects of the president's personality, one might expect incumbents to be evaluated more on the basis of personal attributes. However, both challengers of incumbents and candidates in nonincumbent races are more likely to evoke a strictly candidate attribute response. One interpretation for the emphasis on candidate attributes arises from previous work on schematic assessments of political leaders (Conover, 1981; Miller, Wattenberg, & Malanchuk, 1982 ). These studies demonstrate that people will make inferences about the potential performance of candidates from the candidates' personal attributes when there is little available information on the policy positions or past experience of those running for office. Thus the public places more emphasis on what is readily observable. For \elatively less well-known candidates it can be expected that personal attributes form the primary focus of attention. In addition, the performance-relevant personal characteristics can be expected to be more apparent for incumbents. For example, in 1980 many respondents remarked about Carter's weakness and lack of decisiveness in a clearly performance-laden fashion. In other words, it may not be that personal attributes are less important in judging incumbents but rather that they are more politicized.
Turning to the individual candidates, it is clear that although Nie, Verba, and Petrocik (1976) failed to separate policy from performance, they were nevertheless correct in arguing that policy alternatives have become more prevalent in candidate evaluations since 1964. In all the possible comparisons candidates from the 1952-1960 period rank lowest in percentage of policy-related comments. Also confirmed is the conventional wisdom concerning the exceptionally high salience of policy questions in the elections of 1964 and 1972. In particular, 1972 stands out as the most policy-oriented election, because a greater percentage commented on Nixon's policies than about any other incumbent, and similarly McGovern was evaluated more on policy matters than any other challenger.
Somewhat less expected, however, is the increase over time in the percentage of performance responses for both incumbents and challengers, which reached its height in the 1976 contest. One explanation is that with the decline of political parties performance assessments are now much more clearly candidate-centered than in the past (see Wattenberg, 1984) . Another possible factor is the tremendous growth in the power of the federal government during this period. As presidential performance has assumed greater significance in people's everyday lives, it seems logical that voters would be more likely to evaluate candidates on this basis.
Thus far we have yet to consider the time dimension of the open-ended responses for each particular candidate. From Table 3 it can be seen how the policy/performance dimension combines with the retrospective/prospective dimension for each. Because virtually all the candidate attribute responses were coded as retrospective, we have not incorporated them into Table 3 and will therefore forego any use of the time dimension with respect to attributes throughout the remainder of the analysis. Also, for the purpose of greater clarity, we have eliminated any response with a "mixed" code on either dimension in Table   3 .
The prevalence of the joint categories displayed in Table 3 holds considerable theoretical interest. The differentiation between the issue voting models of Key and Downs, for example, depends largely on whether evaluations of the incumbent are mainly retrospective or projected into the future. It is clear that the data are more supportive of Key's model, because very few performance comments about incumbents were prospective in nature. Indeed, even assessments that focused on the incumbent's policies were largely retrospective. All told, 87% of the policy and performance responses regarding incumbents were coded as retrospective. Only in the cases of Johnson and Ford were more than 10% of the issue comments prospective. Having not been elected to the presidency and having served only about half a term, these two candidates had less of a past record and therefore were evaluated somewhat more prospectively.
For challengers of course the picture is vastly different. Performance judgments were split fairly evenly between retrospective and prospective comments, whereas policy responses were predominantly prospective. Thus citizens take into account the challenger's past record of performance (e.g., Carter or Reagan's service as a governor) as well as his or her promised future performance. Policies, however, present a clear case where the incumbent's past program is compared to the proposed program of the challenger.
Finally, in nonincumbent races prospective comments are slightly more prevalent than retrospective ones for both policy and performance. This differs, however, according to whether or not the candidate represents the same party as the outgoing president. Of the comments regarding candidates from the incumbent party. 52% were retrospective compared to only 350/0 for their opponents. Thus the former are apparently held at least somewhat responsible for the recent performance and policies of their party.
In sum, the data presented in this section sug- Only incumbents appear to be judged as suggested by Key-mindful of the past but attentive primarily to outcomes rather than to policy instruments. The Downsian model, on the other hand, seems to fit best as a description of how citizens judge challengers, as they are assessed primarily in terms of the programs they promise to initiate if elected. The data appear to confirm a common sense notion of rational cognitive processes. When information on past performance is available voters readily form judgments based on this criteria. In this case there is less necessity for them to make inferences about the future. The absence of such concrete information for evaluating nonincumbents, however, allows for greater opportunity for policy innovation by the candidates and greater public concern over the direction of policy. In short, the public appears to act in a highly responsible fashion, basing their evaluations on the most reliable and concrete information available.
Issue Evaluations and the Vote
Having examined the relative preponderance of the substantive categories used by the public to evaluate candidates, we next turn to an assessment of how these evaluations have been translated into the vote. The first step in this investigation is to determine if particular candidates were advantaged or disadvantaged by judgments focused on either policy or performance, past or future. Clearly the categorization of assessments by behavioral focus (policy/performance) and a time perspective will be of little theoretical utility if there is no systematic variation in evaluations with respect to these categories. Table 4 , therefore, presents summary figures representing the percentage of voters making positive comments minus the percentage making negative comments for each combination of the policy/performance and retrospective/prospective dimensions, as well as for the attribute dimension.
Clearly the most volatile of the issue categories is retrospective performance. This is largely the result of responses concerning incumbents running for reelection and is reflective of the great public approval of the performance in office of Eisenhower, Johnson, and Nixon, and the unprecedented disapproval of Carter's past performance. In contrast, prospective performance is more likely to yield a substantial partisan advantage in nonincumbent races. Indeed, this is the case in 1952 and 1968, when Eisenhower and Nixon respectively enjoyed an edge on this category.
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However, the largest advantage on prospective performance went to Johnson over Goldwater in 1964, with Goldwater receiving the lowest score on this for any candidate in the time series and Johnson receiving the third highest.
The partisan advantage associated with retrospective policy evaluations is the most stable from 1952 to 1980, with the edge usually going to the Democratic candidate. This can be explained by the fact that Democratic candidates are more often positively associated with helping such groups as the working man or any of the variety of groups that made up the New Deal coalition, while Republican candidates are negatively associated with the interests of the rich and big business. Although such responses are sometimes vague, they generally connote helping one group rather than another, that is, a choice of policy directions. The greatest partisan advantage on retrospective policy, however, came as the result of policy regarding one particular individual. This was Ford's pardon of Nixon, which was the focus of many negative retrospective policy comments in 1976.
Only the ideological elections of 1964 and 1972 show much evidence of a substantial partisan advantage on prospective policy. Given a clear chOIce between future policies in these years, the public responded favorably to the policies they perceived Johnson and Nixon would pursue and negatively toward those of Goldwater and McGovern. Although prospective policy comments were somewhat more prevalent in 1972 (see Table 2 ), the advantage that Johnson enjoyed over his opponent was far greater than that of Nixon, thereby indicating a clearer policy mandate in 1964.
Finally, the attribute code displays a clear example of the incumbency advantage in presidential elections. In all five cases the incumbent was the recipient of more positive comments directed toward his personal attributes than the challenger. This is in large part because comments such as "he's more experienced" fall into this category, which is more likely to benefit the incumbent. Even Carter far outdistanced Reagan on this score in 1980, because many respondents complimented him for his experience and integrity whereas Reagan's advanced age and past movie career evoked numerous negative comments. This advantage may well also extend to the candidate of the incumbent party during nonincumbent races, as in each of these three contests the president's chosen successor had the edge.
Yet to be established, however, is whether or not these categories are related to the vote, and if so, to what degree. Taking just the four issue categories in which we are primarily interested and regressing them on the vote, it is clear that candidate policy and performance evaluations 1952, .33; 1956, .32; 1960, .40; 1964, .49; 1968, .46; 1972, .47; 1976, .49; 1980, .53.) Given the open-ended nature of the data, this is a substantial percentage of explained variance. Thus, although Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes (1960) Achen's (1982) guidelines for interpreting and using regression, we chose to use a measure of dispersion importance to address the first question and a measure of level importance to examine the second. The measure of dispersion importance is commonly known as a "standardized beta," which is the regression coefficient when all variables have been ' Because of the problems associated with using OLS regression with a dichotomous dependent variable, we also conducted a pro bit analysis for each year. The results were virtually identical from a substantive perspective, and therefore we present the regression results for their greater ease of interpretability.
standardized to a mean of zero and a variance of one. For measuring level importance we simply multiplied the mean of each independent variable by its unstandardized coefficient, thereby producing the net contribution to the level of the dependent variable, that is, the vote. Thus if a variable has a level importance of 1.0 in Table 6 , it means that the distribution on it resulted in a change of 1 % of the vote in favor of the Republican candidate.
One general theme flowing through this article thus far is the difference in public evaluations of candidates according to incumbency status. Following this, one would expect to find the structure of the vote decision, as measured by the standardized betas, to differ according to whether or not the incumbent was a candidate for reelection. Indeed, the three nonincumbent races of 1952, 1960, and 1968 stand out as the only elections in which prospective performance outweighs the other three issue variables in terms of dispersion importance (see Table 5 ). Yet as can be seen from the level importance coefficients in Table 6 , prospective performance has not been a major factor in shifting the outcome of elections one way or the other. The largest net gain from prospective performance evaluations was only slightly more than 1 % by Richard Nixon in 1968.
For races with incumbents, retrospective performance clearly plays a much greater role. In the two most recent elections for which we have data-1976 and 1980-its importance in explaining variance in the vote exceeds not only all the other issue variables but the candidate attribute variable as well. Furthermore, the effect on shifts in the two-party vote has been substantial, averaging 2.9% in the five elections with incumbent presidents seeking reelection. Most notably, the difference between assessments of Carter's and Reagan's past performance in 1980 can be estimated to have cost Carter 5.2% of the vote.
In only two elections, 1964 and 1972, can we conclude that policy considerations exerted more influence over the collective voting decision than performance assessments. The large standardized Note. The entries are computed by multiplying the mean of each independent variable by the unstandardized regression coefficient. The regression equation is identical in form to that used for T-able S.
betas for both retrospective and prospective policy in 1964 combined with the substantial advantage Johnson enjoyed over Goldwater in positive versus negative policy comments (see Table 4 ) lends strong support for interpreting the 1964 election as a policy mandate for Lyndon Johnson. To a lesser degree the 1972 election also fits the requirements for a policy mandate. As noted earlier, the frequency of policy responses was even higher in the Nixon-McGovern contest. However, the beta weight for retrospective policy is somewhat lower in 1972, and comments about Nixon's policy stands were not as positive as those for Johnson, nor were McGovern's policies seen as negatively as Goldwater's. Thus although the two policy categories combined contributed 3.2"70 to Johnson's victory, they only gave Nixon about 1.3%. Finally, the 1980 election outcome, for which a policy mandate has also sometimes been claimed (cf., Miller & Shanks, 1982) shows even less evidence of being determined by policy factors. The comparative lack of policy responses and the absence of any sizeable candidate advantage resulting from these comments, plus the much lower policy coefficients shown in Table 5 all work to dissuade us from interpreting the 1980 result as a policy mandate. While evaluations of Reagan were as policy laden as those for Goldwater, evaluations of Carter were far more performance oriented than those of either Johnson or Nixon (see Table 2 ). Furthermore, these comments about Carter's performance provided Reagan with virtually all of his advantage on issues. As can be seen in Table 5 , Reagan gained only .5% because of policy evaluations in 1980 compared to more than 5% from performance evaluations.
Conclusion
The work reported above begins to provide some empirical support for a theory of issue voting. Despite data limitations, respondents could be classified by applying a two-dimensional retrospective/prospective, policy/performance coding scheme to their verbal assessments of the candidates. In addition. a factor analysis of available closed-ended items from the 1980 election study showed a similar structure of voter cognitions. These two very different approaches both show that assessments of Carter primarily reflected concern about his past performance, whereas evaluations of Reagan focused on future policy actions as well as expected performance. This striking similarity helps assure us that our results are valid.
The data demonstrate that people are not only capable of judging the past performance of incumbents, but they frequently become concerned about the future application of policy instruments. Historically, neither retrospective nor prospective policy considerations have been the dominant focus of thinking about politics. Nevertheless, when candidates articulate discernible policy positions, the public can incorporate this information into their electoral decision. When this information is available, citizens can vote in a manner that indicates a policy mandate for future government actions. Such cases have been historically rare, however.
The data suggest that under varying circumstances the voting theories of Key, Downs, and Fiorina each have substantial merit. Key's emphasis on retrospective performance applies best to public assessments of incumbents running for reelection. The Downsian model, in contrast. seems best to fit challengers, whom are often evaluated on the basis of their proposed future policies. Finally, Fiorina's concentration on prospective performance provides the best description of public judgments of candidates running in nonincumbent races.
Our ability in this article to test such a variety of theories throughout the entire 1952-1980 period demonstrates the great utility of open-ended questions in electoral research. It is extremely difficult to test models or theories if measures of critical concepts are developed ad hoc and with little guidance from the theory itself, as has all too often been the case in the election studies. Over the years, however, diverse use has been made of the open-ended questions, which can be reanalyzed with different theories in mind. The richness of the open-ended questions suggests that more of these questions should be asked in future studies, and a means of making the verbatim responses more accessible should be sought.
Coding Appendix
Coding of the distinction between retrospective/prospective and policy/performance utilized the responses to the eight candidate and party likes/dislikes questions which have been asked in every presidential election survey conducted by the University of Michigan since 1952.
The coding of the open-ended responses was done from the original protocols on file at the Center for Political Studies at the University of Michigan. For the surveys conducted before 1968 those materials are on microfilm; whereas the actual interview schedules are still available for the more recent years. We wish to thank CPS for making these materials available to us.
Some 30 different individuals were engaged in the coding project, which took one and a half years to complete. The average number of interviews coded per person was approximately 435. Each coder was trained with a set of 50 selected interviews before they began their production coding.
The training procedure was as follows. Before coding we met with the coders to discuss the project and to specify the concepts of policy, performance, retrospective, and prospective. The coders were then asked to read Fiorina (1981, pp. 1-16) and Abramson et al. (1982, chaps. 6 and 7) as a further overview of the theoretical dimensions we wished to differentiate. Next the coders were assigned to code 50 interviews which had been systematically selected for the purposes of coder training. Each of these examples was then discussed in depth, and any discrepancies were clarified and resolved. After training each coder was assigned a designated set of interviews to complete. Coders were instructed to discuss ambiguous statements with the coding supervisor (a coder trained on the first study coded) and to bring only unresolvable coding problems to the principal investigators. This procedure was followed in order to avoid the unwitting introduction of a coding bias by the investigators.
The studies were also coded in a particular order in an effort to avoid the artifactual introduction of a trend. First the 1980 study was coded, followed by 1956 , 1964 , and 1972 . Next the 1976 , 1960 , 1952 , and 1968 studies were coded in that order. Given this sequence for coding the studies, as well as the large number of coders, it is highly unlikely that any of the results arose because of systematic coder bias.
The coding scheme was designed to allow for gradations of clarity in the respondents' statements, thereby reducing the difficulty of the coding task. The policy-performance dimension, for example, ranged from "clearly policy" to "clearly performance" with a "mixed" or combination policy and performance category in the middle of the scale. In addition the code categories allowed for candidate attributes and any performance comments that had no issue content (e.g., "he can't get things done," "he is doing a good job"). The values assigned in the coding and the code categories are summarized below.
Retrospective/Prospective
A sample of 625 of the interviews coded were coded again by a second person to obtain reliability coefficients. Intercoder reliability was calculated with the formula: 1.0 -(total disagreements/total entries), where an entry was a codable response, that is, other than missing data, for each variable. A disagreement occurred whenever the two coders had a discrepancy that indicated a difference in the direction of the result; that is, where one coded retrospective and the other prospective or mixed, or one coded policy and the other coded performance or mixed or candidate attribute. It should be noted that many of the coding errors were found to be related to the difficulty of reading the questionnaire responses from microfilm. When the actual questionnaires were available, as they were for the 1968-1980 studies, the reliability coefficients were well over .90.
